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WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

8 MAR 1950

Mr. Daniel Com Fabry, Jr. Bational Security Resources Board Washington 25, D. G.

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NO CHANGE IN CLASS.	
DEGLASSIFIED	TS \$ 102011
NEXT REVIEW DATE:	
DATE: 13 APR REV	IEWERI.

In your letter of 5 Hereh, 1950, you request by coticeto of the pass bility of all-out our between the builted states and the USSR before 1957.

In rior of the ultimate objective of Doviet pality a Communict world order under Soviet desiration - and of the
existing Subernational situation, there is a present despor of
war which cannot be ignored. In present or comparable directstances a deliberate, unprovoked boviet attack on the United States
is improbable, as is any Soviet military approaches despot to
incor serious risk of mar with the United States. There is, however, a excissing despor of war through also about tion, nor can
the possibility of deliberate attack be presently excluded for
consideration.

pendent on two feature: (1) the prospective development of Seviet capabilities, with perticular reference to a suppositive of large-scale atomic attack; and (2) concernent developments with respect to the political and military posture of the United States and its allies.

In the period under consideration the USSE will be capable of delivering a crippling attack on the USSE will be capable of delivering a crippling attack on the United States, if is defended have been neglected or if surprise one be cohieved. This qualified capability sould not of itself render probable on improvided attack. The most ruthless and agrees we distatorably sould want reasonable certainty, not only of ultimate success, but also of relative imposity, before deliberately initiating atomic warfare. A substantial seviet atomic capability, however, would increase the possibility of deliberate attack. By encouraging leviet political agreesies, it would also increase the damper of mer through miscolonisation.



The second factor is loss calculable. The acid overcount of a strong Session political military posture sould tend to deter Soviet aggression, but the certain prospect of that achievement could economically provide a presentive nowlet attack.

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- (1) A deliberate, unprovoked Soriat attack before
- (a) There is, however, a continuing design of
- (8) This deeper will probably increase progressionly during the period under consideration.

This estimate is bened on all intelligence independent evaluable to the dependences and ependences of the government. For each of thee, however, it has not been coordinated with the decorporated intelligence agencies. As you know, a relevant formal estimate in now in process of coordination, but is unlikely to become available at an early date.

Minourel.

stoned - dies ~ 10 + R 3/8/50.

D/G1, ORF-LLM/vnc

R. H. HILLENKOETTER
REAR ADMIRAL. USN
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

CC- Falloy
DCI
AD/URE
D/ME (C/C/F Res leaves)
Contral Records
D/G1

NOTE FOR RECORD:

Basic states the Pres had directed that Bureau of Budget & NSRB carefully examine current stockpiling program and its objectives and advisehim concerning their adequacy and timeliness from the standpoint of security. An est of the time element inherent in the risk of war must necessarily be one of the basic points considered in providing such a review for the Pres. States he, Daniel Cox Fahey, has been asked by Bureau-NSRB Committee working on this review to ascertain for them CIA's answer to following question: What are the possibilities that the USSR will provoke an all out attack against the U.S. before the end of 1953? Before the end of 1956?

Correspondence file on
"Appraisal of Foreign Economic Intelligence
Requirements, Facilities and Arrangements Related
to the National Security"

filed "NSC Reports"